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SUBLET V. STATE: AUTHENTICATION OF EVIDENCE FROM 
SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES REQUIRES A TRIAL 
JUDGE TO FIND SUFFICIENT PROOF FROM WHICH A 
REASONABLE JUROR COULD CONCLUDE THAT THE 
EVIDENCE IS WHAT THE PROPONENT CLAIMS IT TO BE. 
 
By: Denise A. Blake 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in three consolidated cases, held that a 
trial judge must determine that evidence from a social networking website 
meets the “reasonable juror” standard of authentication as a condition 
precedent to admissibility.  Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 678, 113 A.3d 695, 
722 (2015).  This standard requires a preliminary determination by the trial 
judge that a reasonable juror could find the evidence is what the proponent 
claims it to be.  Id.  
     In the first case, Albert Sublet IV (“Sublet”) allegedly assaulted Chrishell 
Parker (“Parker”) and her family.  At trial, Sublet sought to introduce into 
evidence four pages of Parker’s Facebook posts about the incident.  Parker 
admitted the Facebook page was hers and that she had written some posts 
about the incident, but denied writing the entries on the fourth page.  The trial 
judge sustained the State’s objection to the admission of the posts because it 
was not clear whether Parker was responsible for all of the posts.  The judge 
held because Parker’s password was not secret, other people could have 
accessed her Facebook page, and her denial had not been contradicted by 
expert testimony. 
     In the second case, Tavares Harris (“Harris”) allegedly shot Jared C. and 
Wasima Gary.  At trial, the State attempted to introduce Harris’ direct 
messages and tweets, which alluded to retaliation for an earlier incident 
involving Jared C.  The State planned to authenticate the social media 
messages through expert testimony about the forensic examination of cell 
phones.  Over objection, the trial judge admitted the evidence after 
determining the posts had been properly authenticated by the expert testimony 
and independent witness verification of Harris’ Twitter account. 
     In the third case, Carlos Alberto Monge-Martinez (“Monge-Martinez”) 
allegedly stabbed his former girlfriend.  The State tried to introduce Facebook 
messages allegedly sent by Monge-Martinez to prove he had intentionally 
assaulted his former girlfriend.  Over objection, the trial judge allowed the 
victim to testify as to the distinct characteristics of the messages she received 
and admitted the messages into evidence.  
     Sublet, Harris, and Monge-Martinez were convicted in their respective 
circuit court and subsequently appealed.  The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the lower courts’ decisions in Sublet and Monge-Martinez.  
Both defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ of 
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certiorari, which were granted.  The court granted certiorari in Harris sua 
sponte due to the similar subject matter, and consolidated all three cases.  
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland previously established a standard for 
authenticating evidence from social networking websites in Griffin v. State.  
Sublet, 442 Md. at 662, 113 A.3d at 712 (citing Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 
346-47, 19 A.3d 415, 417 (2011)).  Pursuant to Md. Rules of Evid. § 5-
901(b)(1) and (4), the court recommended three non-exclusive methods of 
authenticating social media evidence.  Sublet, 442 Md. at 663, 113 A.3d at 
713.  To confirm that the alleged author created the content in question, the 
court will allow counsel to: (1) ask the alleged author to verify his or her social 
networking profile and the post(s) in question; (2) examine the internet history 
and hard drive of the alleged author’s computer to determine whether it 
originated from that computer; and (3) use any additional information 
provided by the social networking website that confirms the allegations.  Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
     Due to the increased use of social media evidence, the court of appeals 
decided to refine the Griffin authentication standard.  Sublet, 442 Md. at 663-
64, 113 A.3d at 713-14.  The court adopted the standard established by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Vayner.  Id. at 664, 113 A.3d at 714 (citing United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 
123 (2d Cir. 2014)).  The Vayner standard requires the trial judge to make a 
preliminary “context-specific determination whether . . . sufficient proof [has 
been introduced from which] a reasonable juror could find . . . that the 
evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.”  Sublet, 442 at 666, 113 A.3d 
at 715 (internal citations omitted). The proof may be direct or circumstantial 
and does not have to be of a specific type or quantity.  Id. at 667, 113 A.3d at 
715.  After the evidence is authenticated, opponents may challenge its 
reliability, minimize its significance, or propose alternative explanations, just 
as any other piece of evidence.  Determining the reliability of the evidence is 
left to the jury.  Id. at 668-69, 113 A.3d at 717 (citing United States v. 
Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 2001)).     
     Applying the Vayner standard, the court of appeals affirmed the 
convictions in each consolidated case respectively.  Sublet, 442 Md. at 671, 
673, 676-77, 113 A.3d at 718-19, 721-22.  In Sublet’s case, the court held that 
the trial judge did not err in excluding the Facebook posts allegedly authored 
by Parker because there was not sufficient proof of authenticity.  Id. at 673, 
113 A.3d at 719. Parker denied authoring the posts and no proof of distinct 
characteristics was presented.  Id. at 672-73, 113 A.3d at 718-19. 
     In Harris, the court of appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse her 
discretion by admitting Twitter messages and tweets authored by Harris.  
Sublet, 442 Md. at 675-76, 113 A.3d at 720-21.  The Twitter username, 
accompanying photographs, and message content were distinct characteristics 
that constituted sufficient proof to allow a reasonable juror to possibly find the 
messages and the tweets to be authentic.  Id.  In Monge-Martinez, the court of 
appeals held that the trial judge did not err in admitting Facebook posts 
authored by Monge-Martinez.  Id. at 677, 113 A.3d at 722.  The messages 
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were sufficient proof of authentication because they were written soon after 
the incident, in Spanish, and contained expressions of remorse.  Id. at 677, 113 
A.3d at 721. 
     In Sublet, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a trial judge must 
determine that sufficient proof has been offered so that a reasonable juror may 
find evidence from a social networking website to be authentic.  The court 
should provide more stringent guidelines as to the appropriate methods of 
authenticating social media evidence.  Without such, trial judges may apply 
the standard inconsistently and with too much discretion, resulting in jurors 
considering insufficiently authenticated evidence. 
 
